Tension in the Pacific

Only a few days ago I wrote Declining social mood evident in the Pacific, which looked at disputes over territorial waters and Japan's extension of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Here's one Chinese outlook.
China takes new tack in maritime diplomacy

Beijing's stance on the South China Sea is a proclamation that China will no longer tolerate activity deemed unfriendly or hostile there, since no country would compromise on any issue concerning its core national interests.

In the Yellow Sea too, China has reacted with unprecedented strength over a planned United States-South Korean joint naval maneuver, which reportedly is likely to start now that the United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution on the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March. A firmer stand seems likely on territorial waters in the East China Sea, where China this month has been carrying out naval exercises aimed at rattling the United States over its sale of weapons to Taiwan.

Part of this is not socionomic, but rather the rise of China. Greater friction is natural when there is a rising power, no matter the intentions of the participants.

China's naval exercise happened, interestingly enough, after a PLAN officer told two visiting senior US officials in Beijing in March that China regarded the South China Sea as its territorial water and core national interest - the first time this has been said.

A major reason for China's more proactive interventions in regard to safeguarding its rights and interests in its territorial waters is that with its growing economic muscle, China no longer wants to tolerate any threat in its "near" seas from its neighbors or the United States.

The overtly unfriendly posture toward China from two of its strategic partners - the US and South Korea - is unacceptable to Beijing, especially since China compromised on the Iran nuclear issue and the Cheonan incident by voting in line with the US on two Security Council resolutions.

And the biggest conflict may be over territorial claims and natural resources with China's neighbors, not the U.S.:

Beijing's claim that the South China Sea (and hence other near seas) is part of its core interests is not only in response to perceptions of a US challenge, but also to the realities of geopolitical conflict in the area. In Beijing's view, the most controversial islands in the South China Sea, especially the Nansha (or Spratly) islands, have been occupied by neighboring countries.

Among them, Vietnam is perceived as the most aggressive, followed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Yet China only controls a small part of the Nansha islands, while the biggest island in the group, Taiping, is managed by Taiwan.

Mostly due to Beijing's weakness on the issue, these countries became more ambitious in strengthening their hold of the islands in the South China Sea. Vietnam, for example, has placed a new administrative division on some islands - although they have no permanent residents - and developed some tourist routes, and built military infrastructure to lay greater claim to sovereignty.

And then we come to the changing attitude of China (or what the author believes the change should be):

China should not be unjustly labeled as nationalistic, since it never claims other countries' territory. Simply for the sake of keeping "peace" and "stability", for a long time China has adopted an appeasement policy toward the US and neighboring countries.

But now, Beijing perhaps thinks appeasement is coming to an end. A friendly China is considered by some neighbors as a weak state, and hence potential conflicts are accumulating. So Beijing must stop playing the part of a non-contentious person. In the long run, a tougher China with a clear strategic policy toward the South China Sea and other seas will help maintain stability and peace in East and Southeast Asia.

Since the policy of "shelving disputes and co-developing" cannot effectively be put into practice because of a lack of cooperation from some Southeast Asian countries, it should be replaced by a new policy, even though the image of China as a peaceful rising power could be damaged.

The most probably area of conflict is not between the major powers in the Pacific, at least initially, but between China and its smaller neighbors. If the U.S. or Japan decided to get involved in these disputes, then there would be potential for wider conflict, but there's no reason for these disputes to ever result in military conflict. The major powers could reach agreements and freeze out the smaller states, for instance. A declining social mood does, however, make greater conflict more likely.