2010-07-13

Tension in the Pacific

Only a few days ago I wrote Declining social mood evident in the Pacific, which looked at disputes over territorial waters and Japan's extension of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Here's one Chinese outlook.
China takes new tack in maritime diplomacy
Beijing's stance on the South China Sea is a proclamation that China will no longer tolerate activity deemed unfriendly or hostile there, since no country would compromise on any issue concerning its core national interests.

In the Yellow Sea too, China has reacted with unprecedented strength over a planned United States-South Korean joint naval maneuver, which reportedly is likely to start now that the United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution on the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March. A firmer stand seems likely on territorial waters in the East China Sea, where China this month has been carrying out naval exercises aimed at rattling the United States over its sale of weapons to Taiwan.
Part of this is not socionomic, but rather the rise of China. Greater friction is natural when there is a rising power, no matter the intentions of the participants.
China's naval exercise happened, interestingly enough, after a PLAN officer told two visiting senior US officials in Beijing in March that China regarded the South China Sea as its territorial water and core national interest - the first time this has been said.

A major reason for China's more proactive interventions in regard to safeguarding its rights and interests in its territorial waters is that with its growing economic muscle, China no longer wants to tolerate any threat in its "near" seas from its neighbors or the United States.

The overtly unfriendly posture toward China from two of its strategic partners - the US and South Korea - is unacceptable to Beijing, especially since China compromised on the Iran nuclear issue and the Cheonan incident by voting in line with the US on two Security Council resolutions.
And the biggest conflict may be over territorial claims and natural resources with China's neighbors, not the U.S.:
Beijing's claim that the South China Sea (and hence other near seas) is part of its core interests is not only in response to perceptions of a US challenge, but also to the realities of geopolitical conflict in the area. In Beijing's view, the most controversial islands in the South China Sea, especially the Nansha (or Spratly) islands, have been occupied by neighboring countries.

Among them, Vietnam is perceived as the most aggressive, followed by the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Yet China only controls a small part of the Nansha islands, while the biggest island in the group, Taiping, is managed by Taiwan.

Mostly due to Beijing's weakness on the issue, these countries became more ambitious in strengthening their hold of the islands in the South China Sea. Vietnam, for example, has placed a new administrative division on some islands - although they have no permanent residents - and developed some tourist routes, and built military infrastructure to lay greater claim to sovereignty.
And then we come to the changing attitude of China (or what the author believes the change should be):
China should not be unjustly labeled as nationalistic, since it never claims other countries' territory. Simply for the sake of keeping "peace" and "stability", for a long time China has adopted an appeasement policy toward the US and neighboring countries.

But now, Beijing perhaps thinks appeasement is coming to an end. A friendly China is considered by some neighbors as a weak state, and hence potential conflicts are accumulating. So Beijing must stop playing the part of a non-contentious person. In the long run, a tougher China with a clear strategic policy toward the South China Sea and other seas will help maintain stability and peace in East and Southeast Asia.

Since the policy of "shelving disputes and co-developing" cannot effectively be put into practice because of a lack of cooperation from some Southeast Asian countries, it should be replaced by a new policy, even though the image of China as a peaceful rising power could be damaged.
The most probably area of conflict is not between the major powers in the Pacific, at least initially, but between China and its smaller neighbors. If the U.S. or Japan decided to get involved in these disputes, then there would be potential for wider conflict, but there's no reason for these disputes to ever result in military conflict. The major powers could reach agreements and freeze out the smaller states, for instance. A declining social mood does, however, make greater conflict more likely.

Chinese credit rating agency Dagong cuts U.S. credit rating

There's certainly an opening for competitors in the ratings agency game, given the performance of the firms. David Einhorn described the problem in his speech to the Value Investing Congress in 2009.
My firm recently met with a Moody’s sovereign risk team covering twenty countries in Asia and the Middle East. They have only four professionals covering the entire region. Moody’s does not have a long-term quantitative model that incorporates changes in the population, incomes, expected tax rates, and so forth. They use a short-term outlook – only 12-18 months – to analyze data to assess countries’ abilities to finance themselves. Moody’s makes five-year medium-term qualitative assessments for each country, but does not appear to do any long-term quantitative or critical work.

Their main role, again, appears to be to tell everyone that things are fine, until a real crisis emerges at which point they will pile-on credit downgrades at the least opportune moment, making a difficult situation even more difficult for the authorities to manage.

Dagong rates the United States one notch below the other ratings agencies and it is the highest rated country with a negative outlook.
Sovereign Credit Rating Report of 50 Countries in 2010

Dagong Global Credit Rating
大公国际资信评估有限公司

H/T: Dian L. Chu

Local currencies grab attention

The Telegraph covered local currencies more than three years ago.
Rival to euro as Germans cash in on currency
Germans get by without the euro

Now NPR is covering the story.
From Stalwart To Skeptic, Germany Rethinks EU Role

The local currency story is a long running one, these can be found all over the world. The difference is the declining social mood: why reporters select these stories and how people feel about it when they read it.

2010-07-12

Germany gets tough on sovereign debtors

Merkel's Rules for Bankruptcy
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would be involved in the debt refinancing from the outset. The German experts see the IMF playing a key role. If representatives of the Washington-based organization determine that debt forgiveness and restructuring have failed, then the second phase of the procedure kicks in.

It amounts to a complete refinancing. According to the concept, "this will require restrictions on sovereign discretionary powers." In other words, the government of the affected country would no longer be able to fully dispose of its own treasury.

Institutionalized Disempowerment

It would be replaced with "an individual or group of individuals familiar with the regional characteristics of the debtor nation," which would safeguard the financial interests of the bankrupt country. The Berlin Club would have the authority to appoint these individuals.

The concept toughens the stance, particularly toward creditors, but also toward the debt-ridden country. If it is implemented, it will amount to an institutionalized disempowerment of a debtor nation's government by the IMF and the new Berlin Club, at least in its final stage. This prospect alone could have a disciplining effect on overspending governments.

From a economic standpoint, the plan is a step in the right direction—but how will it be received?

We should use the supply side school of thought from former president Ronald Reagan

G20 looks to Beijing to drive global growth
Yi Xianrong, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Cass), estimates that there are 64.5m empty flats and houses in China, many of them bought by speculators – the reflection of “an outsize property bubble”, he says in an article in People’s Daily last week.

If falling prices cause a building slump, it will have a big impact on the economy. However, Beijing has a fallback plan. Facing mounting discontent at high house prices, it has announced a huge push to build public housing, including flats that can be rented by low-income families. Local government officials are under heavy pressure to comply. The central Chinese municipality of Chongqing has announced plans to build 10m square metres of social housing a year – equivalent to more than a third of its residential construction in 2009.

“In the future 30-40 per cent will live in low-income government housing,” says Huang Qifan, the mayor of Chongqing. “The government should provide more land and housing, otherwise property prices will be driven up. We should use the supply side school of thought from former president Ronald Reagan.”
Increasing supply doesn't always work during the early phases of an asset bubble because it allows more people to participate, but the supply increases help to crater the price on the downside.

2010-07-11

Election in Japan

Your Party faring well among start-up parties
Among a set of start-up parties, only Your Party, which seeks a small-government platform, is faring well in Sunday's upper house election and is seen racking up around 10 of the 121 seats up for grabs, according to exit polls by Kyodo News.
Turnout was up in the election.

This comes as the DPJ suffered a setback and lost control of the upper house. Here's a list of possible coalition partners for the DPJ and their position on the major issues. Deflation is a major topic in Japan and inflation of 1-2 percent is a policy favored by several parties.

China's oil majors expand globally

For those interested in energy, an interactive map from the Economic Observer.

China Oil Goes Global

China considers another stimulus plan

China Likely to Introduce New Stimulus Measures
On June 30, a source who attended the seminar revealed its tone to the EO: "Everyone is worried about the next half of the year's economy."

In an interview with the EO, Yin Zhongqing, vice director of the Finance and Economic Committee of the National People's Congress said, "It is possible for China's macro-economy to rise drastically in 2010, but it also has the risk of decreasing drastically."

Due to concerns over the recent decline in economic indicators such as the purchasing manager index, urban fixed-asset investment, and real estate and automobile sales numbers, China is likely to launch a new round of economic stimulus measures.

People are no Longer Optimistic About the Second Quarter

After entering the second quarter, economic indicators have experienced a slight drop from the first quarter's development trend. With that in mind, officials at the National People's Congress Finance and Economic Committee and ministries and commissions expressed their concerns about the economy of the next half year.

The decline was first reflected in the purchasing manager index (PMI), an indicator for economic activity. According to the China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing (CFLP), compared with April's PMI, the PMI in May dropped 1.8 percentage points. Of the eleven PMI sub-indicators, ten presented a drop.

In addition, according to June's PMI released by the CFPL, the purchase price index decreased drastically from last month, especially the price index of raw materials stockpile which dropped to below 50 percent.

Furthermore, the indicator of added-value for large-scale industrial enterprises also slowed. The indicator's growth rate in May was 1.3 percentage points lower than April's; April's indicator was 0.3 percentage points below March's.

In addition, the urban fixed-assets investment in the first four months had a year-on-year decrease of 4.4 percentage points; the urban fixed-assets investment of the first five months were 0.2 percentage points below the first four month of this year.

What is more worrying is that the recent sales volumes of real estate and automobiles began to decrease. According to statistics released by the China Index Academy, of the 35 big cities monitored, housing sales in 14 cities decreased in May, and the sales of automobiles in May dropped 7.5 percent compared with April's sales.

Meanwhile, the degree of support from overseas demand to China's economic growth weakened. The trade surplus in the first four months of this year fell 78.6 percent from a year earlier, and the trade surplus in the first five months experienced a year-on-year drop of 69.9 percent.
However, the trade surplus did rebound in June.
CHINA'S trade surplus widened to the highest this year and exports climbed more than estimated to a record in June, adding pressure on the government to let the currency gain after the US said the yuan ''remains undervalued''.

The gap increased 140 per cent to $US20.02 billion ($A22.8 billion) from a year earlier, China's customs bureau said on its website. That compares with the $US15.6 billion median estimate of 24 economists surveyed by Bloomberg. Exports surged 43.9 per cent and import growth moderated for the third month, rising 34.1 per cent.
Sounds like a recipe for conflict, as the Americans press China on the currency and the Chinese try to raise economic growth, with currency appreciation near the bottom of the list of priorities.

China's biggest developer cuts prices, but rents up in many cities

Why is Vanke Reducing its Property Prices?
Though Vanke Group, China's largest residential real estate developer, gained a business revenue of around 35.5 billion yuan in the first half of 2010, its Shenzhen subsidiary has reduced the price of its small-sized apartments from around 20,000 yuan per square meter to 9,000 yuan; triggering the spread of the rumor that Vanke is cutting the prices of all its properties.

On June 16, Vanke's Shanghai subsidiary began selling its products at a price of 32,000 yuan per square meter, 5,000 yuan less than their original price.
Prices are coming down in some areas of the market due to the recent spate of regulations, such as higher down payments, higher interest rates, and restrictions on second and third mortgages.
On June 20, the price of homes in Tianyangcheng, a property project located in Hebei Province near Beijing, was reduced from 11,000 yuan per square meter to 7,800 yuan, the largest deduction rate in Beijing since April.

Li Yibing, deputy general manager of Tianyang Property, said to an EO reporter, "We performed a one-time steep drop in our prices, we do not want to waste time bargaining."

He said, the Tianyang Property wanted home buyers to know that a 30 percent discount was the bottom line and there would be no lower price.

Tianyang has got what it wanted. On the first day it announced the 30 percent discount, almost all of its 300 houses were sold out.

It is not easy to know where housing prices will go from here, however, we may get some clues from the financial conditions of property enterprises. Adfaith, one of China's leading consultancy companies, has conducted a survey of 30 mainstream listed property firms which shows, if their trade volume decreases by 30 percent, the companies that would suffer from the most severe shortage of money would be property giants Evergrande and Poly Real Estate, with a funding shortage of over ten billion yuan.

Many real estate companies failed to sell a single property in May and June. Therefore a 30 percent deduction in trade volume is a conservative prediction. "Though developers all knew that there would be new regulation on the property market starting earlier this year, they still chose to expand their business. This has caused their cash outflow to be almost equal to that of the first half of last year, yet their sales volume has greatly decreased in the second quarter of this year," Hao Ju, Adfaith's deputy president, said.

He continued, in 2009, property companies all had positive cash flow. But if they expanded too fast, their sales revenue would not be able to support their expansion. Poly Real Estate serves as a good example of the risks of rapid expansion.

However, the problem of capital shortage may be solved through various means of financing. "Among all the tests on companies' capital shortfalls, the biggest uncertainty lies in their financing methods." Hao Ju said.
With home prices down and real estate companies struggling, rents are filling in the gaps for some real estate firms.

Rents on the Rise in Chinese Cities
Although the housing prices in Beijing have been cooling down, rents are climbing.

The average rent of housing in Beijing was 2,885 yuan per month in May, up 20 percent on the level of the same period last year, according to statistics from Lianjia Property, a real estate agency in Beijing.

For example, a house with two bedrooms located near Beijing's third-ring road only cost 2,600 yuan per month to rent before May, but now costs 3,000 yuan per month. Additionally, to rent a single room only ten square meters large located in the same neighborhood costs at least 1,200 yuan per month.

"The lasting recession in the second-hand property market has made housing rentals the main source of revenue for real estate agencies. They have to rely on rentals to meet the cost of their overheads," a source who once worked as a deputy general manager of a real estate agency said.

Conflicts among real estate agencies have occurred recently in Beijing over clients, property and even advertising space, indicating a severely competitive market.

Aside from seeking more property to rent out, real estate agencies also try to make the most of existing housing. For example, agencies will divide a 130 square meter apartment into six separate rooms and then rent it out to about ten people at a total price of 7,500 yuan per month. The apartment owner only earns 6,000 yuan per month from his property; the real estate agency will earn about 15,000 yuan per year from a single apartment.

Seeking larger profits, some agencies even encourage homeowners to raise their rents. For example, when renting a one bedroom apartment, an agency will recommend the homeowner to ask for 2,800 to 3,200 yuan per month. Last year, the price of a one-bedroom apartment was only 2,000 yuan per month.

With severe battles taking place among real estate agencies, some have monopolized the rental market of certain housing communities in order to have more say in pricing them.
Eventually, the competition will break the rental market and rents will move lower, assuming the market is allowed to function. The Chinese government may decide to undo some restrictions in order to support home prices, if the decline in prices becomes too large.

2010-07-10

Municipal bonds threaten banking system

David Goldman looks at municipal debt on bank balance sheets in
The Bank-Insurance-Municipal Daisy Chain (Why the Federal Government Will Bail Out the States)
If municipal debt actually defaulted, the capital position of the banking system would be impacted, bank preferred debt might stop paying, and the holders of bank preferred debt–starting with the insurers–would be in serious trouble.
...Why buy munis? For all of Warren Buffett’s dire warnings about municipal finances, the fact is that the federal government can’t let major municipal debtors (at the level of states, for example) go under without also bringing down the banking system and everything else.

If it goes, it all will go together. That’s why munis ultimately will be bailed out. A Democratic administration whose core constituency is public employee unions will do everything in its power to keep them happy (and a Republican Congress, which we likely will have in 2011, may frustrate this). But ultimately it’s a matter of survival.
Just something to think about when someone says that a few defaults in the muni bond market won't cause any problems.

And don't forget Americas #1 investor also expects a bailout of municipal bonds and sells insurance on munis:

Socionomics—The Fall of Warren Buffett

Declining social mood evident in the Pacific

The Vanishing American Consumer and the Coming Trade War
It’s clear American consumers can’t get the economy going on their own. They can’t restart the jobs machine. They’ve run out of money and credit.

It’s not just that one out of four Americans is unemployed or underemployed (working part-time, overqualified, or at a lower wage than before). More significantly, the Great Recession burst the housing bubble that had let American consumers turn their homes into ATMs. Now the cash machines are closed.

So the Administration figures foreign consumers will have to fill the gap.
Economists used to call recessions depressions, until the Great Depression. Now we have the Great Recession. They're going to need a new word. Back to Reich talking about the drive to sell to Chinese and Indian consumers...
Yes, but. As of now China and India are still relying on net exports to fuel their growth. Even if you think their middle classes will eventually become so big and rich they can buy everything these nations will be able to produce, that doesn’t mean they’ll also buy what the rest of the world produces.

Yes, global companies will do wonderfully well. General Motors is well on the way to selling more cars in China than it does in the U.S. But American workers won’t get the jobs, and nor will workers in Europe, Japan, or the rest of the world. GM makes the cars it sells to Chinese consumers in China.
And he says that productive capacity is growing faster than consumption...
This means Obama and others won’t easily find the export markets they need to create enough jobs to make up for the vanishing American consumer.

When the world’s productive capacities exceed the buying power of the world’s consumers, every government wants to increase exports and discourage imports. That spells trade war.
It also spells deflation.
And watch out for under-the-radar protectionist moves. Since the start of 2008, when the Great Recession began, countries around the world have already imposed at least 443 measures to block imports, according to the Center for Economic Policy Research.

This is just the start.
The key thing to me is that we are seeing deterioration in bilateral relationships such as U.S.-China even as there's supposedly an economic recovery and a stock market rally. The currency push was big news recently, but the Obama administration declined to call China a currency manipulator. When the next decline kicks off, relations will be in a worse place than they finished at the end of the previous decline and the probability of a more direction confrontation on trade will be much higher.

U.S. Tomahawk Missiles Deployed Near China Send Message
That's why alarm bells would have sounded in Beijing on June 28 when the Tomahawk-laden 560-ft. U.S.S. Ohio popped up in the Philippines' Subic Bay. More alarms were likely sounded when the U.S.S. Michigan arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on the same day. And the Klaxons would have maxed out as the U.S.S. Florida surfaced, also on the same day, at the joint U.S.-British naval base on Diego Garcia, a flyspeck of an island in the Indian Ocean. In all, the Chinese military awoke to find as many as 462 new Tomahawks deployed by the U.S. in its neighborhood. "There's been a decision to bolster our forces in the Pacific," says Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There is no doubt that China will stand up and take notice."
It's not like the U.S. is acting without support:
Many nations in the eastern Pacific, including Australia, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and Vietnam, have been encouraging the U.S. to push back against what they see as China's increasingly aggressive actions in the South China Sea.
And on that note...

Japan takes a shot at China- via Taiwan

Japan has extended its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) near Taiwan in the East China Sea without consulting Taiwanese authorities in advance. Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT) government has condemned Japan's unilateral move in a tone unusually firm compared with previous Taiwanese administrations that dealt with similar issues.
This is interesting because Japan's prime minister was forced to resign because he did not follow up with a pledge to get the Americans out of Okinawa.
Yonaguni is the western-most island of Japan and lies 180 kilometers from the Taiwanese east coast. The ADIZ line, which has defined two-thirds of Yonganui's airspace as being Taiwanese and one third as Japanese, was drawn by the US military after World War II.

On June 26, Japan unilaterally extended the ADIZ line westwards by 22 kilometers. As a result, Taiwanese and Japanese AIDZs now overlap. That Tokyo seems willing to put up with the prospect of doing damage to Taiwan-Japan relations shows how much it worries about China's military activities in the East China Sea. At least three disputed economically and militarily important areas lie in this part of the Pacific Ocean.

The roots of the Sino-Japan East China Sea conflict lie in the cryptic wording of the "Preamble to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 76". There, it is stated that "The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance".

According to China, the Okinawa Trough, an arc-shaped ocean trench that runs from southwestern Japan to northeastern Taiwan, separates China's and Japan's continental shelves. Beijing therefore claims that its territorial waters extend to the trough's center line. To Japan on the other hand, the Okinawa Trough is nothing but an "accidental depression" in the ocean floor and not the clear-cut boundary between continental shelves as China claims. Therefore, according to Tokyo's logic, it's the "200 nautical miles" mentioned in Article 76 that define the edges of China's territorial waters in the East China Sea.

The knowledge that the few kilometers where waters claimed by both Beijing and Tokyo overlap not only hold large reserves of oil, gas and fish but also are of strategic importance has been fueling the dispute. In recent years, both sides have significantly increased their military presence in the region.
And that increased presence has led to more incidents:
From a Japanese perspective, China has been challenging Japan's interests in the East China Sea in ever-shorter intervals. China's navy has been coming closer and closer and has crossed sea lines considered sensitive by Japan. It's obvious that Japan's extension of its ADIZ is to be seen in the context of the complicated East China Sea sovereignty disputes. Tokyo's choice to go ahead with the extension without consulting Taiwan's authorities is revealing since it demonstrates that Japan worries to a high degree.
It's not hard to see where this could be headed, but the economic conflict will erupt first. How the economic confrontation is handled will shape how this situation evolves.

2010-07-09

Time to short the euro?

Big short covering and a weak rally. Back to January levels of speculative shorts at the Merc.
I'm not sure that the rally is over, but with so many shorts closed out, the odds are tilting back in the bear's favor.

2010-07-08

Is communist theory making a comeback?

Welcome to the Slavoj Zizek Show
In the midst of a crisis of capitalism, the Western underground is rediscovering communism.
It's not what you think. Socialism is really dying:
Some 20 years after the tentative end of the communist experiment, and exactly 21 months after the near-collapse of the capitalist status quo, there is apparently a new yearning -- not for leftist policy, but for leftist theory. As practical problems become more pressing, our democracy becomes weary, the euro seems headed for failure, Germany's coalition government becomes less and less effective, and the banks more and more unmanageable, the more abstract does the search for truth and the practice of philosophy become.
We are in the crisis of the real and the leftists are turning to theory, they are moving in the wrong direction.
Zizek loves to correct viewpoints when precisely the opposite is considered correct. He calls this counterintuitive observation. His favorite thought form is the paradox. Using his psychoanalytical skills, he attempts to demonstrate how liberal democracy manipulates people. One of his famous everyday observations on this subject relates to the buttons used to close the door in elevators. He has discovered that they are placebos. The doors don't close a second faster when one presses the button, but they don't have to. It's sufficient that the person pressing the button has the illusion that he is able to influence something. The political illusion machine that calls itself Western democracy functions in exactly the same way, says Zizek.
A great description of the disconnect between voters and their government. The answer is more control. In some places, this will be authoritarian, in others, the devolution of power.
"I know that people often think I'm an idiot," he says that evening, "that nostalgic Leninist. But I'm not crazy. I'm much more modest and much more pessimistic."

Why pessimistic? In fact, it isn't absurd at all to assume that capitalism and democracy have reached a dead end. "That's true," says Zizek, "but I believe that the left is, tragically, bereft of any vision to be taken seriously. We all wish for a real, authentic revolution! But it has take place far away, preferably in Cuba, Vietnam, China or Nicaragua. The advantage of that is that it allows us to continue with our careers here."

Putting two and two together

Credit-card late payments fall to eight-year low
Late payments for bank-provided credit cards fell in the first quarter to the lowest level in eight years, the American Bankers Association reported Wednesday.

Bank-card delinquencies, reflecting card payments that are at least 30 days overdue, fell to 3.88% of all accounts in the first quarter -- the lowest rate since the first quarter of 2002 -- compared with 4.39% in the fourth quarter of 2009, according to ABA data.
Consumer Credit Plunges In May, April Revised Much Lower
The latest consumer credit number continues the decline we have seen in recent months, plunging from $2424.4 billion in April to $2415.3 billion in May, a $9.1 billion decline, or 4.5% annualized, on consensus of $2.3 billion. Yet the biggest stunner was the April revision which was whacked from +$1 billion to a revised -$14.9 billion!

In other words, there has been a $24 billion decline in consumer credit in the past two months. The biggest hit was, as usual, experienced by revolving credit accounts, which fell by a 10.5 annualized rate to $830.8 billion, from $838.2 billion in April, and just north of $910 billion a year earlier.
You can't have a bad debt if there's no debt to begin with.

Another explanation for the former story is that people are not paying their mortgage in states where there are non-recourse mortgages, but they are paying their credit card bill to keep their spending going. Once they are foreclosed on, however, they will have to find a place to rent and their spending will drop.

Japan debates the consumption tax

The Japanese are having the same debate as everyone else. Higher taxes or cut spending?

2010-07-07

Andy Xie: The Puzzle of Carruades de Lafite

The English translation of Andy Xie's latest article is out. This section deals with how Chinese luxury consumers are distorting the wine market.
The Puzzle of Carruades de Lafite

While I am not sure that the Lafite phenomenon is a bubble, I am quite sure that Chateau Lafite's second label, Carruades de Lafite or little Lafite in Chinese, is a bubble. The production of fine wine requires the vine age to average 30-40 years. Vines older than 80 years must be replaced. Hence, a chateau is always taking out old vines and planting young vines. But grapes from young vines cannot produce high quality wine. Great chateaus like Lafite and Latour use the grapes from young vines to produce second label wine to recover some costs. These second labels are usually quite cheap. They are usually much cheaper than second growth wines.

For example, Lafite's second label, Carruades de Lafite, sold for about 200 Pitish pounds per case until five years ago. Since 2005, the price of Carruades de Lafite has increased roughly ten times. Its price sometimes rival the prices of non-Lafite first growth wines and is usually higher than great second growth wines. Little Lafite is not a bad table wine. But it is definitely not a grand wine. Its meteoric rise is really due to mistaken identity.

As Lafite's price becomes a small fortune, the search for a substitute is a natural market response. In China, the substitute is little Lafite. The choice is way off the mark. If one shifts from Lafite to Latour, Haut Pion, or Margaux, it would be rational. Their qualities are similar. When Lafite's price is so much higher than that of others, they should become the next choices. But, in Chinese, little Lafite has the connotation of Lafite's junior Pother, probably similar but a bit less good. Hence, it becomes the substitute for Lafite. Moreover, as its price has risen, it seems to confirm its worth. At least the choice doesn't look cheap to the host.

The magnitude of price distortion in the Carruades de Lafite is probably similar to that of internet stocks in 2000. Of course, over time, the bubble bursts. So why should we be upset about it? The problem is that it has become an insult to other great winemakers. I'm really ashamed of the enormous Chinese demand that has created this phenomenon. I personally witnessed Chinese tourists unloading cases of little Lafite at enormous prices in Bordeaux to ship back to China.

2010-07-06

What will happen to loan growth in China?

China Halts Loan Repackaging
Many trust companies received phone calls last Friday from the China Banking Regulatory Commission. The business of trust companies will be curtailed as the volume of wealth-management products account for two-thirds of their total business.
This is the practiced used by banks and finance companies in the U.S. to remove mortgages from their balance sheet, but the Chinese are nipping this practice in the bud.

2010-07-05

人民币“再出海” Yuan goes to sea again

人民币“再出海”
RMB "and then out to sea" (Google translation)

A lengthy article discussing currency reform in China. The Google translation is not very good, but the rough ideas are there. Interesting description of Hong Kong serving as a firewall for hot money flows into China.

I've seen very little coverage of the developments in China in the Western press, though I did find this article from a little over a week ago:
A deeper look at China's currency reform
One new development has been the expansion of renminbi trade settlements. Cross-border renminbi trade settlement is now allowed in all countries, after starting first in Hong Kong, Macau and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This brings with it a new issue -- where to park the renminbi?

A quickening pace in the development of offshore renminbi products is one area to watch. Foreign investors should find more options to gain exposure to renminbi with better returns. Hong Kong will be at the forefront here, says HSBC, and a mini Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme is on the agenda, giving renminbi investors access to domestic China stocks.

Krugman's Opium War

Antal E. Fekete targets Krugman and those pressing China to revalue its currency.
Friedman asserted, wrongly, that variable foreign exchange rates would eliminate trade imbalances. As the currency of the surplus country appreciates, exports are discouraged while imports are encouraged. Conversely, as the currency of the deficit country depreciates, exports are encouraged while imports are discouraged. This forces adjustments in the volume of imports and exports that will continue until trade balance is restored.

The equilibrating effect of exchange rates on imports and exports is, at best, ephemeral. It may last as long as the inventory of ingredients that go into the exports of the deficit country does. But no sooner had these inventories been exhausted and needed replenishing than euphoria came to an abrupt end. As a direct consequence of the lower value of the currency of the deficit country, its terms of trade deteriorates, while that of the surplus country improves. In particular, the deficit country has the disadvantage of paying higher, while the surplus country has the advantage of paying lower prices for the imported components that go into their respective exports. The competitiveness of the deficit country suffers a further setback. Rather than working towards equilibrium, the floating exchange rate regime works towards perpetuating imbalances, nay, making them progressively worse. It throws the deficit countries into a vicious downward spiral from which it is ever more difficult to escape.
KRUGMAN’S OPIUM WAR ON CHINA (link goes to pdf)

谢国忠: 名酒怪象

Andy Xie's latest article discusses Chinese consumer behavior. Sales of luxury brands are doing very well in Asia and he says many shops in Europe have Mandarin speaking staff. He talks about the current Chinese luxury consumer's attention to marketing over quality (in a later bit on French wine sales), while noticing a healthy appetite for luxury goods:
另一方面,中国游客组团出游。他们住小酒店,吃方便面,却在路易威登(LV)皮包上一掷千金。中国人花钱买的是耐用消费品,而美国人花钱都吃到肚子里了。两国游客消费行为的本质区别,不会随人民币升值而改变。如果人民币升值,肯定有利于LV的销售,但是,这对美国的出口毫无帮助。
He says the Chinese in Paris will stay in cheap hotels and eat instant noodles, but will buy Louis Vitton handbags. The Americans prefer to spend money on food. And the change in the value of the renminbi will not change this. It's good news for Louis Vitton exports, but not for American exports. Full article in Chinese here: 名酒怪象. An English translation should be out in a few days.